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SUBJECT: ASIA TRIP OF SECSTATE

1. ~~THE~~ SECOND SESSION OF DISCUSSION WITH PRC FOREIGN MINISTER
HU LASTED THREE HOURS AND CONCENTRATED ON THE ISSUES OF THE FALKLANDS,
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, KAMPUCHEA AND
AFGHANISTAN. TOWARD THE END OF THE SESSION WE WERE INFORMED THAT
ZHANG AIPING, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WOULD SEE SECSTATE FRIDAY
A.M. THIS MEETING WAS NOT HERETOFORE SCHEDULED.

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EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
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2. (BT) THE CHINESE DESCRIBED THEIR MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS AS CONSULTATIONS ON NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BUT STATED THAT BEFORE ANY PROGRAM COULD BE MADE THE THREE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS MUST BE MET: (1) SOVIETS MUST CEASE SUPPORT FOR THE VIETNAMESE IN KAMPUCHEA; (2) SOVIETS MUST WITHDRAW FROM MONGOLIA AND DRASTICALLY REDUCE THEIR TROOP STRENGTH ALONG THE COMMON BORDER; (3) SOVIETS MUST WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. THE PRC SAID THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO MOVEMENT. SECSTATE STATED THAT OUR SOVIET POLICY HAD THREE PARTS: (1) REALISTIC IN ANALYSIS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING; (2) MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP OUR MILITARY STRENGTH; (3) BE READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS AND SEEK CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS. 3. (S) KAMPUCHEA AND AFGHANISTAN WERE AREAS OF MUCH CLOSER AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE PRC SIDE DID ASK US TO REVEAL OUR POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION (THEIR WORD) AGAINST THE P.V.X. SECSTATE INDICATED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE ASSISTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST MEMBERS OF THE COALITION ONLY. 4. (S) THE THIRD SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER LASTED THREE HOURS AND WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY CONCERNED WITH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER RAN THROUGH A LAUNDRY-LIST OF "IRRITANTS" IN THE RELATIONSHIP INCLUDING [

IN TURN AND THE DISCUSSION WAS LOW-KEYED AND PRODUCTIVE. THE SECRETARY WAS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN HANDLING THE TECHNOLOGY QUESTION. IT APPEARED THAT A GREAT DEAL OF MISINFORMATION WAS EXISTENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE. [

5. (S) THE LAST SESSION OF THE SECOND DAY WAS WITH THE STATE COUNCILLOR FOR S & T AND WAS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO A DISCUSSION OF TECH TRANSFER. AGAIN SECSTATE WAS MOST EFFECTIVE POINTING OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PROBLEMS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. HE POINTED OUT THAT, FOR OUR PART, WE ALSO DESIRED ACCESS TO PRC FACILITIES ETC.

6. (S) IT APPEARS THAT THE CHINESE DESIRE TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL VISIT. WE WILL HAVE A BETTER FIX ON THAT WHEN WE SEE HOW PREMIER ZHAO AND DENG DEAL WITH SECSTATE. IF THEY SIMPLY RE-PLow THE GROUND ALREADY COVERED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE ATMOSPHERE COULD BECOME STRAINED AND TEDIOUS.

7. (BT) REGARDING TECH TRANSFER, IT IS CLEAR THAT A SYSTEM OF APPROVALS/DISAPPROVALS SHOULD BE INSTITUTED CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER WHICH IS TIMELY. MANY OF THE CHINESE COMPLAINTS CONCERN THE DELAY OF NOTIFICATION ON APPROVALS/DISAPPROVALS. THEY PREFER TO KNOW DIRECTLY IF A DENIAL IS IN THE OFFING. THIS AID THEM IN THEIR PLANNING PROCESS. THIS SEEMS A FAIR POINT AND ONE THAT SHOULD

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C L Blosser 12-16-82

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BE CONSIDERED INTERAGENCY. VERY RESPECTFULLY, RICH.

501 DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.
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